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In this paper, we offer for two-person games an alternative characterization of
Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (IKSNC), which was introduced
and first characterized by Saglam (2016) for n-person games. We present an
axiom called Γ-Decomposability, satisfied by any solution that is decomposable
with respect to a given reference solution Γ. We then show that the IKSNC
solution is uniquely characterized by Γ-Decomposability whenever Γ satisfies
the standard axioms of Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations and
Symmetry, along with three additional axioms, namely Restricted Monotonicity
of Individually Best Extensions, Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives,
and Weak Pareto Optimality under Symmetry.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Saglam (2016) proposed a new n-person bargaining solution,
called Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (IKSNC), which recon-
ciles between the well-known solutions of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky using
no more information than is already contained in these solutions. He also
showed that this new solution can be characterized by a single axiom called
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Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Decomposability, which requires that the outcome of
the solution on any bargaining problem can be obtained by first calculating the
referential compromise point at which each player receives the minimum of the
utility payoffs he or she would have received under the Kalai-Smorodinsky and
Nash solutions, and then adding this point to the solution of the subproblem
admitting it as both the starting and the disagreement point.1
The procedure of repeated use of a concept for defining a solution was in-
troduced by Raiffa (1953) in the definition of the discrete (sequential) Raiffa
solution. For an alternative characterization of the same solution, this proce-
dure was recently translated by Trockel (2015) into an axiom, called Repeated
Application of the Same Solution (RASS), which is a weakening of an earlier
axiom of Kalai (1977), called Step by Step Negotiations.2 The axiom of RASS
requires that for any problem including a bargaining set S and a disagreement
point d in S, the solution on (S, d) can be obtained by calculating the solution
on a reduced problem (S′, d′) instead, where d′ is the solution on the largest
hyperplane game (SHd , d) with S
H
d ⊆ S and S′ is the set of utilities in S not
smaller than d′. While the IKSNC solution does not satisfy the axiom of RASS
by Trockel (2015), it satisfies, for two-person games, a similar property which we
call Γ-Decomposability.3 Given a referential solution Γ, this axiom is satisfied
by any solution F if it chooses on any (well-defined) problem S an allocation
point that can be obtained by adding the reference solution point Γ(S) to the
solution of F on the utilities in S that are not smaller than Γ(S).
The main result of this paper is that in a two-person bargaining setup the IK-
SNC solution is the unique solution that satisfies the axiom of Γ-Decomposability
when the solution Γ satisfies the axioms of IEUR and SY along with three addi-
1The solution of Saglam (2015) can be obtained by the repeated use of an axiom of Rach-
milevitch (2014), called Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Robustness (KSNR). This axiom requires
that each agent receives at least the minimum of the utility payoffs he or she would have
received under the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions.
2This axiom of Kalai (1977) requires that for any two bargaining problems S and S′ with
S′ ⊇ S and the disagreement points normalized to zero, the solution on S′ can be obtained
by first calculating the solution on S and then taking it to be the starting point for the
distribution of the utilities in S′ to calculate the solution on this normalized set.
3Various forms of decomposability axioms were earlier used by Salonen (1988), Rachmile-
vitch (2012), Saglam (2014), and Trockel (2014), among others.
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tional axioms, namely Restricted Monotonicity of Individually Best Extensions
(RMIBE), Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (WIIA), and Weak
Pareto Optimality under Symmetry (WPO-S). Altogether, these five axioms
uniquely characterize a solution called Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise
(KSNC), which selects the aforementioned referential compromise point at each
bargaining problem and yields the IKSNC solution when indefinitely repeated.
WPO-S requires the solution to lie on the weak Pareto frontier of the bargaining
problem whenever it is symmetric. Clearly, this axiom weakens WPO, a com-
mon axiom of Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions not satisfied by the KSNC
solution. Likewise, WIIA weakens the axiom of IIA, which is also not satisfied
by the KSNC solution. WIIA demands that if a bargaining set S contracts to a
subset S′ that contains for each player the individually best extension of the so-
lution on S, then for each player the individually best extension of the solution
on S and on S′ must be the same. Finally, the axiom of RMIBE requests that
if a bargaining set S expands to a set S′ with the ideal point being unchanged,
then the individually best extension of the solution on S′ for some player must
be weakly Pareto superior to the individually best extension of the solution on S
for at least one of the players. In our characterization result, the axiom of WIIA
is needed because of the dependence of the KSNC solution on the Nash solu-
tion. On the other hand, the axiom of RMIBE accounts for the dependence of
the KSNC solution on the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. However, RMIBE nei-
ther implies nor is implied by the Restricted Monotonicity axiom used by Roth
(1979) in an alternative characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for
two-person games.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic structures
and Section 3 presents our axiomatization results. Finally, Section 4 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 Basic Structures
We consider a two-person bargaining problem (simply a problem) denoted by
a nonempty subset S of R2+, representing von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
attainable through the cooperative actions of two agents. If the agents fail to
agree on any point in S, then each of them gets zero utility (i.e., the disagreement
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utility is normalized yo zero). We also assume that
(a) S is compact and convex and there exists x ∈ S such that x > 0;4
(b) for all x, y ∈ R2+, i.e., if x ∈ S and x ≥ y ≥ 0, then y ∈ S (comprehen-
siveness or the possibility of free disposal of utility).
Let Σ20 denote the set of all 0-normalized two-person bargaining problems
satisfying the above assumptions. We define a solution F on Σ20 as a mapping
from Σ20 to R2+ such that for each S ∈ Σ20, F (S) ∈ S. The solution by Nash
(1950) maps each problem S ∈ Σ20 to the point N(S) = argmaxx∈S x1x2, at
which the product of players’ payoff gains from agreement is maximized. Below,
we will present the set of axioms used by Nash (1950) for an arbitrary solution
F on Σ20.
Let the weak and the strong Pareto frontier of any set S ∈ R2+ be respec-
tively defined as WP (S) = {x ∈ S | y > x implies y /∈ S} and P (S) = {x ∈
S | y ≥ x and y 6= x implies y /∈ S}.
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): If S ∈ Σ20, then F (S) ∈WP (S).
Any set S ∈ R2+ is said to be symmetric if (x1, x2) ∈ S implies (x2, x1) ∈ S.
Symmetry (SY): If S ∈ Σ20 and S is symmetric, then F1(S) = F2(S).
Let Λ be the set of all λ = (λ1, λ2) where each λi : R→ R is a positive affine
function, and let λ(S) = {λ(x) : x ∈ S}.
Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR): If S ∈ Σ20
and λ ∈ Λ, then F (λ(S)) = λ(F (S)).
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S ⊇ S′, and
F (S) ∈ S′, then F (S′) = F (S).
4Given two vectors x and y in R2+, x > y means xi > yi for all i ∈ N and x ≥ y means
xi ≥ yi for i = 1, 2.
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Nash (1950) showed that his solution is the unique solution that satisfies the
axioms of IEUR, IIA, SY, and WPO. In fact, the Nash solution satisfies the
strong version of the Pareto optimality, as well.
Pareto Optimality (PO): If S ∈ Σ20, then F (S) ∈ P (S).
While the axioms of IEUR, SY, and WPO are satisfied by many well-known
solutions and are therefore called the standard axioms in the bargaining liter-
ature, IIA has been a controversial axiom, having led the researchers to seek
for alternative solutions that would satisfy more plausible axioms, possibly in
addition to the standard axioms. In that respect, a well-known alternative is the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), which
is based on the ideal (utopia) point of the given bargaining problem. Formally,
for any bargaining set S, let ai(S) denote the maximal utility agent i can expect
in S, i.e., ai(S) = max{xi : x ∈ S}. Then, for any bargaining problem S, the
point a(S) = (a1(S), a2(S)) is called the ideal point. The Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution selects in each bargaining set the maximal point on the line segment join-
ing the disagreement point to the ideal point. So, it maps each problem S ∈ Σ20
to the point KS(S) ∈ WP (S) such that KS1(S)/KS2(S) = a1(S)/a2(S), im-
plying that each player’s payoff gain from agreement has the same proportion
to his or her ideal payoff gain from agreement. Kalai (1975) showed that this
solution is the only solution that satisfies IEUR, SY, WPO, and the following
axiom. (In fact, for two-person games the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisfies
PO, as well.)
Individual Monotonicity (IM): If S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S′ ⊇ S, and aj(S′) = aj(S),
then Fi(S
′) ≥ Fi(S) for i 6= j.
For two-person problems IM can be replaced by a weaker axiom called Re-
stricted Monotonicity, as shown by Roth (1979). This axiom requires that both
players should weakly benefit from an expansion of the bargaining set if the
ideal point does not change.
Restricted Monotonicity (RM): If S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S′ ⊇ S, and a(S′) = a(S),
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then F (S′) ≥ F (S).
From the characterization results of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solu-
tions for two-person games, it should become evident that these two solutions are
distinguished from each other only by whether they possess RM or IIA. In sit-
uations where it may be necessary to reconcile between the Kalai-Smorodinsky
and Nash solutions (or alternatively between the axioms of RM and IIA), one
can use the compromise point in Rachmilevitch (2014) to define a benchmark
solution. Formally, given any problem S, the said compromise point is the al-
location C(S) in S such that Ci(S) = min{KSi(S), Ni(S)} for every i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, consider the solution that maps each problem S ∈ Σ20 to the point C(S).
We will call this solution Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (KSNC).
Obviously, KSNC is not a desirable solution because it does not satisfy
WPO. However, as observed by Saglam (2016), one can iterate KSNC to obtain
a limit point on the weak Pareto frontier of a given problem. Formally, given
any problem S ∈ Σ20 and any point a ∈ S, define S − {a} = {y ∈ R2 : y =
x− a for some x ∈ S}. Then, consider the sequence of points (ct(S))∞t=0 where
c0(S) = 0, and ct(S) = ct−1(S) + C((S − {ct−1(S)}) ∩ R2+) for each integer
t ≥ 1. (Note that in this definition c1(S) = C(S).) Clearly, limt→∞ ct(S) ∈ S.
The solution that maps each problem S ∈ Σ20 to the point limt→∞ ct(S) is
called, by Saglam (2016), Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise
(IKSNC).
3 Results
We will first study the KSNC solution in its relation to the axioms introduced
in Section 2. (Below, we denote by co(S) the convex-hull of the set S.)
Remark 1. The KSNC solution satisfies both of the axioms IEUR and SY, but
it does not satisfy any of the axioms IIA, RM, and WPO.
Proof. Below, we will check for each axiom in the remark.
IEUR: Let S ∈ Σ20. Since the solutions of Nash (N) and Kalai-Smorodinsky
(K) both satisfy IEUR, for any vector of positive affine functions λ = (λ1, λ2)
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it is true that N(λ(S)) = λ(N(S)) and K(λ(S)) = λ(K(S)). Then, Ci(λ(S)) =
min{Ki(λ(S)), Ni(λ(S))} = λ(min{Ki((S)), Ni((S))} = λ(Ci(S)) for every i ∈
{1, 2}. Thus, C satisfies IEUR.
IIA: Let S = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 0)}. Clearly, S ∈ Σ20. It is easy to
check that N(S) = (1, 1) and K(S) = (4/3, 2/3). Therefore, C(S) = (1, 2/3).
Now, consider
S′ = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (4/3, 2/3), (4/3, 0)}.
Clearly, S′ ∈ Σ20, S ⊇ S′, and C(S) ∈ S′. Also, it is easy to check that
N(S′) = (1, 1) while K(S′) = (8/7, 6/7), implying C(S′) = (1, 6/7). Since
C(S′) 6= C(S), we conclude that C does not satisfy IIA.
SY: Let S ∈ Σ20 be such that S is symmetric. Since both of the solutions
N and K satisfy SY and WPO, N(S) = K(S) and N1(S) = N2(S). Then,
C(S) = N(S), implying C1(S) = C2(S). Thus, C satisfies SY.
RM: Consider the problems
S = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (10/7, 3/7), (2, 0)}
and
S′ = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (2/3, 1), (2, 0)}.
Apparently, S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S′ ⊇ S, and a(S′) = a(S) = (2, 1). One can easily check
that K(S′) = (6/5, 3/5) and N(S′) = (1, 3/4), implying C(S′) = (1, 3/5). On
the other hand, we have K(S) = (10/9, 5/9) and N(S) = (5/4, 1/2), implying
C(S) = (10/9, 1/2). It follows that the inequality C(S′) ≥ C(S) does not hold.
So, C does not satisfy RM.
WPO: Reconsider from above S′ = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (2/3, 1), (2, 0)} ∈ Σ20 with
K(S′) = (6/5, 3/5) and N(S′) = (1, 3/4), implying C(S′) = (1, 3/5). One can
easily check that y ≡ [K(S′) + N(S′)]/2 = (44/40, 27/40) ∈ S′ and y > C(S′).
So, C(S′) /∈WP (S), implying that C does not satisfy WPO. 
Now, we will axiomatize the KSNC solution after introducing a number of
axioms defined for an arbitrary solution F on Σ20. We will first weaken WPO.
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Weak Pareto Optimality under Symmetry (WPO-S): If S ∈ Σ20 is such
that it is symmetric, then F (S) ∈WP (S).
For any problem S ∈ Σ20, let us denote by bi(S, y) the best allocation player
i can expect in P (S), given that agent j 6= i obtains at least yj units of utility.
We will call the allocation bi(S, y) the individually best extension of y on S for
player i.
Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (WIIA): If S, S′ ∈ Σ20,
S ⊇ S′, and bi(S, F (S)) ∈ S′ for every i ∈ {1, 2}, then there exists j ∈ {1, 2}
such that bj(S′, F (S′)) = bj(S, F (S)).
WIIA simply requires that if a bargaining set S contracts to a subset S′ that
contains for every player the individually best extension of the solution on S,
then for some player the individually best extension of the solution on S and S′
must be the same. This axiom weakens the independence axiom, IIA, of Nash
(1950), as illustrated by the below remarks.
Remark 2. IIA implies WIIA.
Proof. Let F be a solution on Σ20 that satisfies IIA and let S, S
′ ∈ Σ20 be
such that S ⊇ S′ and bi(S, F (S)) ∈ S′ for every i ∈ {1, 2}. Then F (S) ∈ S′
by the comprehensiveness of S′. On the other hand, IIA implies that F (S′) =
F (S). Then, we have b1(S′, F (S′)) = b1(S′, F (S)). Note that b1(S, F (S)) ∈
S′ by assumption and b1(S, F (S)) ∈ P (S) by the definition of b1. Thus,
b1(S, F (S)) ∈ S′ ∩ P (S). Moreover, [S′ ∩ P (S)] ⊆ P (S′). So, b1(S, F (S)) ∈
P (S′). Since we also have b1(S′, F (S)) ∈ P (S′) by the definition of b1, we
must have b1(S′, F (S)) = b1(S, F (S)). It then follows that b1(S′, F (S′)) =
b1(S, F (S)), implying that F satisfies WIIA. 
Remark 3. WIIA does not imply IIA.
Proof. Let S, S′ ∈ Σ20 be such that S ⊇ S′, and bi(S,C(S)) ∈ S′ for every
i ∈ {1, 2}. We have Ci(S) = min{KSi(S), Ni(S)} for every i ∈ {1, 2}, by the
definition of the KSNC solution. Since N satisfies PO, there exists k ∈ {1, 2}
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such that bk(S,C(S)) = N(S), implying N(S) ∈ S′ due to the assumption
about S′. Moreover, N(S′) = N(S), since N satisfies IIA. By the definition of
C, it follows that there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that Cj(S′) = Nj(S′). Along with
Nj(S
′) = Nj(S), this implies Cj(S′) = Nj(S). Then, for k 6= j we must have
bk(S′, C(S′)) = N(S), implying bk(S′, C(S′)) = bk(S,C(S)). So, the KSNC
solution satisfies WIIA. On the other hand, Remark 1 shows that the KSNC
solution does not satisfy IIA. 
Restricted Monotonicity of Individually Best Extensions (RMIBE): If
S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S′ ⊇ S, and a(S′) = a(S), then there exists j ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ {1, 2}
such that bj(S′, F (S′)) ≥ bk(S, F (S)).
The above axiom requires that if a bargaining set S expands to a set S′ with
no change in the ideal point, then the individually best extension of the solu-
tion on S′ for some player must be weakly Pareto superior to the individually
best extension of the solution on S for at least one of the players. As will be
shown below, this new axiom neither implies nor is implied by the axiom of RM.
Remark 4. RMIBE does not imply RM.
Proof. Let Sˆ = co{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}. Clearly, Sˆ ∈ Σ20. Let F be a solution
on Σ20 such that
F (S˜) =
{
(3/4, 0) if S˜ = Sˆ,
(1/2, 0) if S˜ 6= Sˆ.
Step 1: Let S, S′ ∈ Σ20 be such that S′ ⊇ S and a(S′) = a(S). If S′ = S, then
the condition for RMIBE trivially holds. So, let S′ 6= S. First assume that S =
Sˆ. Then, F (S) = (3/4, 0), whereas F (S′) = (1/2, 0), since S′ 6= Sˆ. It follows
that b1(S′, F (S′)) = b1(S, F (S)) = (1, 0) since a(S′) = a(S) by assumption
and a(S) = a(Sˆ) = (1, 1). Therefore, for j = 1 and k = 1, the inequality
bj(S, F (S)) ≥ bk(S′, F (S′)) is satisfied. Now, assume that S′ 6= Sˆ. Then, we
must have F (S′) = F (S) = (1/2, 0), implying b1(S′, F (S′)) ≥ b1(S, F (S)) since
S′ ⊇ S. So, it is true that for j = 1 and k = 1, the inequality bj(S, F (S)) ≥
bk(S′, F (S′)) is satisfied.
Step 2: We will show that F does not satisfy RM. Let S = Sˆ and S′ =
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co{(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1)}. Clearly, S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S′ ⊇ S, and a(S′) = a(S). In
order F to satisfy RM, the inequality F (S′) ≥ F (S) must hold. But, we have
F (S′) = (1/2, 0) and F (S) = (3/4, 0), violating this inequality. 
Remark 5. RM does not imply RMIBE.
Proof. Let Sˆ = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}. (Note that Sˆ ∈ Σ20.) Also let F be a
solution on Σ20 such that
F (S˜) =
{
(0, 0) if S˜ = Sˆ,
K(S˜) if S˜ 6= Sˆ.
Step 1. Let S, S′ ∈ Σ20 be such that S′ ⊇ S and a(S′) = a(S). If S′ = S, the
condition for RMIBE trivially holds, thus let S′ 6= S. Note that S′ cannot be
equal to Sˆ. (For otherwise S would also be equal to Sˆ since WP (Sˆ) = P (Sˆ).)
This implies F (S′) = K(S′). As to S, we have two possibilities. If S = Sˆ, then
F (S) = (0, 0). Since K(S′) > (0, 0), the inequality F (S′) ≥ F (S) would be
satisfied. On the other hand, if S 6= Sˆ, then F (S) = K(S). Along with the fact
that F (S′) = K(S′), this implies F (S′) ≥ F (S), since K satisfies RM. We have
established that the inequality F (S′) ≥ F (S) always holds. Thus, F satisfies
RM.
Step 2. Let S = Sˆ and S′ = co{(0, 0), (1, 0), (3/4, 3/4), (0, 1)}. Apparently,
S, S′ ∈ Σ20, S′ ⊇ S, and a(S′) = a(S) = (1, 1). It follows that F (S) = (0, 0) and
F (S′) = K(S′), implying b1(S, F (S)) = b1(S, (0, 0)) = (1, 0) and b2(S, F (S)) =
b2(S, (0, 0)) = (0, 1). On the other hand, b1(S′, F (S′)) = b2(S′, F (S′)) = K(S′)
since K satisfies PO. But, neither K(S′) ≥ (1, 0) nor K(S′) ≥ (0, 1) can
hold, since {(1, 0), (0, 1),K(S′)} ⊂ PO(S′). It then follows that bj(S′, F (S′))
≥ bk(S, F (S)) cannot hold for any j, k ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, F does not satisfy
RMIBE. 
The following remark implies that the axiom of RMIBE is satisfied by any
solution that satisfies both RM and PO (e.g. the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution).
Remark 6. RM and PO together imply RMIBE.
Proof. Let F be a solution that satisfies RM and PO, and consider any
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S, S′ ∈ Σ20 be such that S′ ⊇ S and a(S′) = ai(S). If S′ = S, the condi-
tion for RMIBE trivially holds. So, let S′ 6= S. Note that bj(S′, F (S′)) = F (S′)
for every j ∈ {1, 2} and bk(S, F (S)) = F (S) for every k ∈ {1, 2} by PO. More-
over, F (S′) ≥ F (S) by RM, implying bj(S′, F (S′)) ≥ bk(S, F (S)) for every
j, k ∈ {1, 2}, which ensures that F satisfies RMIBE. 
Now, we are ready to introduce our first characterization result.
Theorem 1. A solution satisfies IEUR, RMIBE, SY, WIIA, and WPO-S if
and only if it is the KSNC solution.
Proof. “⇒”: Remark 1 shows that the KSNC solution satisfies IEUR and
SY. On the other hand, the proof of Remark 3 shows that the KSNC solution
satisfies WII, as well. To show that it satisfies WPO-S, consider any symmetric
S in Σ20. Since both N and K satisfy SY and WPO, we must have N(S) =
K(S), implying C(S) = N(S). Therefore, C(S) ∈ WP (S), implying WPO-S
is satisfied. Finally, to show that the KSNC solution also satisfies RMIBE, let
S, S′ ∈ Σ20 be such that S′ ⊇ S and a(S′) = a(S). If S′ = S, the condition
of RMIBE trivially holds. So, let S′ 6= S. By the definition of the solution
C, we know that Cj(S
′) = Kj(S′) for some j ∈ {1, 2} and Ck(S) = Kk(S) for
some k ∈ {1, 2}. Consider players m,n ∈ {1, 2} such that m 6= j and n 6= k.
Then, we must have bm(S′, C(S′)) = K(S′) and bn(S,C(S)) = K(S). Finally,
since K satisfies RM, we must have K(S′) ≥ K(S), implying bm(S′, C(S′)) ≥
bn(S,C(S)). Thus, the KSNC solution satisfies RMIBE.
“⇐”: Pick any solution F on Σ20 that satisfies IEUR, RMIBE, SY, WIIA,
and WPO-S. Let S ∈ Σ20.
Step 1: Since the solution N satisfies IEUR, there exists a vector of positive
affine functions λ′ = (λ′1, λ
′
2) such that (1, 1) = N(λ
′(S)). Then, let S′ = λ′(S).
Consider T = co{(0, 0), (0, 2), (2, 0)}. As T is symmetric and F satisfies SY and
WPO-S, we have F (T ) = (1, 1). Then, for every i ∈ {1, 2} we have bi(T, F (T )) =
(1, 1), while we already know that (1, 1) ∈ S′. Since F also satisfies WIIA,
there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that bj(S′, F (S′)) = bj(T, F (T )) = (1, 1). Using
(1, 1) = N(S′), we then have bj(S′, F (S′)) = N(S′) for some j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally,
using S′ = λ′(S) along with the fact that both F and N satisfy IEUR, we can
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replace bj(S′, F (S′)) and N(S′) in the above equality with λ′(bj(S, F (S))) and
λ′(N(S)), respectively. This would imply that there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that
bj(S, F (S)) = N(S).
Step 2: Since the solution K satisfies IEUR, there exists a vector of positive
affine functions λ′′ = (λ′′1 , λ
′′
2) such that (1, 1) = K(λ
′′(S)). Then, let S′′ =
λ′′(S). Consider T = co{(0, 0), (0, a2(S′′)), (1, 1), (a1(S′′), 0)}. From K1(S′′) =
K2(S
′′), it follows that a1(S′′) = a2(S′′), implying that T is symmetric. Then,
F (T ) = (1, 1), because F satisfies SY and WPO-S. Note also that S′′ ⊇ T
and a(S′′) = a(T ). Since F satisfies RMIBE, there exist j, k ∈ {1, 2} such
that bj(S′′, F (S′′)) ≥ bk(T, F (T )) = (1, 1). This is equivalent to saying that
there exists j such that bj(S′′, F (S′′)) ≥ K(S′′), since (1, 1) = K(S′′). Finally,
using S′′ = λ′′(S) along with the fact that both F and K satisfy IEUR, we can
replace bj(S′′, F (S′′)) and K(S′′) in the last inequality with λ′′(bj(S, F (S)))
and λ′′(K(S)), respectively. This would imply that there exists j ∈ {1, 2}
such that bj(S, F (S)) ≥ K(S). For every j ∈ {1, 2}, bj(S, F (S)) ∈ P (S) by
definition. Moreover, K(S) ∈ P (S) since K satisfies PO. Thus, we must have
bj(S, F (S)) = K(S) for some j ∈ {1, 2}.
Steps 1 and 2 respectively show that bj(S, F (S)) = N(S) for some j ∈ {1, 2}
and bk(S, F (S)) = K(S) for some k ∈ {1, 2}. So, it must be true that F (S) =
C(S). 
Obviously, the KSNC solution also satisfies a stronger version of WPO-S,
which we call PO-S, since both of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions
satisfy the axiom of PO and the bargaining sets are assumed to be convex.
Pareto Optimality under Symmetry (PO-S): If S ∈ Σ20 and S is symmet-
ric, then F (S) ∈ P (S).
Now, we will consider the characterization of the IKSNC solution. However,
we first observe the following.
Remark 7. The IKSNC solution satisfies all of the axioms IEUR, SY, and
WPO, but it satisfies neither IIA nor RM.
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Proof. Since the solutions K and N are different from each other, the IKSNC
solution is different from both K and N . From the definition of the IKSNC
solution and the fact that the KSNC solution satisfies IEUR and SY, it is clear
that the IKSNC solution satisfies all of the standard axioms IEUR, SY, and
WPO. However, since the solutions K and N are the unique solutions that re-
spectively satisfy RM and IIA in addition to these standard axioms, the IKSNC
solution cannot satisfy RM or IIA. 
Apparently, the IKSNC solution also satisfies PO, as this axiom is satisfied
by both Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions. Now, we consider the following
axiom for any solution F on Σ20.
Γ-Decomposability: If Γ is a solution on Σ20, then F (S) = Γ(S) + F ((S −
Γ(S)) ∩ R2+).
Theorem 2. There exists a unique solution that satisfies Γ-Decomposability
whenever the solution Γ satisfies IEUR, RMIBE, SY, WIIA, and WPO-S. That
solution is the IKSNC solution.
Proof. “Existence”: By Theorem 1, the KSNC solution satisfies IEUR, RMIBE,
SY, WIIA, and WPO-S. On the other hand, the definition of the IKSNC so-
lution implies that the IKSNC solution satisfies Γ-Decomposability when Γ is
equal to KSNC solution. Thus, we have established that there exists a solu-
tion that satisfies Γ-Decomposability whenever the solution Γ satisfies IEUR,
RMIBE, SY, WIIA, and WPO-S.
“Uniqueness”: Let F be a solution that satisfies Γ-Decomposability when-
ever Γ is a solution on Σ20 satisfying IEUR, RMIBE, SY, WIIA, and WPO-S. By
Theorem 1, the solution Γ is unique and equal to the KSNC solution, denoted
by C. Note that Γ-Decomposability with Γ = C implies F (S) = C(S) +F ((S−
C(S))∩R2+) for any S ∈ Σ20. Now, pick any S ∈ Σ20, and consider the sequence of
problems (St)∞t=0 where S
0 = S and St = (St−1−C(St−1))∩R2+ for every integer
t ≥ 1. It is clear that F (S0) = C(S0)+F ((S0−C(S0))∩R2+) = C(S0)+F (S1).
Iterating this equation t more times yields F (S0) = (
∑t
j=0 C(S
j)) + F (St+1),
implying F (St+1) = F (S0) −∑tj=0 C(Sj) for every integer t ≥ 0. Recall that
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given any S ∈ Σ20, the IKSNC solution selects the allocation limt→∞ ct(S0) in
S. Now suppose that F (S0) 6= limt→∞ ct(S0). Then, one can easily show by
the geometry of the rule F that there exists k ≥ 0 such that F (Sk+1) /∈ Sk+1, a
contradiction. Therefore, F (S0) = limt→∞ ct(S0). Since S ∈ Σ20 was arbitrarily
picked, F must coincide with the IKSNC solution. 
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to offer, for two-person games, an alterna-
tive characterization of Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise, a new
bargaining solution introduced by Saglam (2016) for n-person games. To that
end, we have introduced an axiom called Γ-Decomposability, which requires that
given a reference solution Γ the outcome of the solution F on any bargaining
problem S can be obtained by adding the solution point Γ(S) to the solution
point chosen by F on the subproblem of S admitting Γ(S) as its starting point.
We have showed that the axiom of Γ-Decomposability uniquely characterizes the
IKSNC solution whenever the solution Γ associated with the axiom is requested
to satisfy the standard axioms of IEUR and SY, along with three additional
axioms we have introduced in this paper, namely RMIBE, WIIA, and WPO-S.
These five axioms in fact characterize the KSNC solution, which -if indefinitely
repeated- yields the IKSNC solution. Of these five axioms, IEUR, SY, and
WPO-S account for the common attributes of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash
solutions over which a one-shot compromise yields the KSNC solution. On
the other hand, RMIBE and WIIA are needed to axiomatize the uncommon
attributes of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Nash solutions, respectively.
The future research might extend our work to n-person games. We should
recall here that the characterization of the IKSNC solution critically depends
on the characterization of the KSNC solution that chooses for each player the
minimum of the utility payoffs he or she would have received under the Kalai-
Smorodinsky and Nash solutions. As already known, the axiomatization result
by Nash (1950) for two-person games straightforwardly extends to n-person
games. On the other hand, for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution axiomatization
results are nontrivially different for the two-person and n-person games (when
14
n ≥ 3) as shown by the work of Thomson (1983).5 Thus, one may conjecture
that the axiomatization of the KSNC solution could also be different for the two
types of games.
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